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Abstract
We investigate properties of ABA+, a formalism that ex-
tends the well studied structured argumentation formalism
Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA) with a preference
handling mechanism. In particular, we establish desirable
properties that ABA+ semantics exhibit. These pave way
to the satisfaction by ABA+ of some (arguably) desirable
principles of preference handling in argumentation and non-
monotonic reasoning, as well as non-monotonic inference
properties of ABA+ under various semantics.
1 Introduction
Recent decades have seen a number of non-
monotonic reasoning (NMR) formalisms advanced
(see e.g. (Brewka, Niemela¨, and Truszczyn´ski 2007) for an
overview). Since preferences are ubiquitous in common-
sense reasoning, there has been a considerable effort to
integrate preference information within NMR formalisms
(cf. e.g. (Brewka, Truszczyn´ski, and Niemela¨ 2008;
Delgrande et al. 2004; Domshlak et al. 2011;
Kaci 2011)). To evaluate distinct formalisms, var-
ious properties of both non-monotonic inference
and preference handling have been proposed, see
e.g. (Makinson 1988; Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990;
Brewka and Eiter 1999; Brewka, Truszczyn´ski, and Woltran 2010;
ˇSimko 2014).
Meanwhile, argumentation (as overviewed in
(Rahwan and Simari 2009)) has become an established
branch of AI widely used for NMR (see e.g. (Dung 1995;
Bondarenko et al. 1997; Modgil and Prakken 2013)).
Broadly speaking, information in argumentation is repre-
sented via arguments, while attacks among them indicate
conflicts. Procedures, known as argumentation semantics,
are employed to select extensions, i.e. sets of collectively
acceptable arguments. Preferences in argumentation also
play a significant role (cf. e.g. (Simari and Loui 1992;
Kaci 2011)), by allowing to, for instance, discrimi-
nate among arguments or extensions. Over the years,
numerous formalisms of argumentation with prefer-
ences have been presented (see Section 7) and some
properties for argumentation with preferences indi-
cated (e.g. (Brewka, Truszczyn´ski, and Woltran 2010;
Modgil and Prakken 2013; Amgoud and Vesic 2014;
Dung 2016)).
NMR properties are also adaptable to argumen-
tation setting. For example, the well known non-
monotonic inference properties of Cautious Monotonic-
ity and Cumulative Transitivity (cf. (Makinson 1988;
Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990)) concern what hap-
pens when a conclusion reached through a reasoning process
is added to the knowledge base to reason with anew. These
properties have been cast with respect to extensions in argu-
mentation, in e.g. ( ˇCyras and Toni 2015; Dung 2016).
Preference handling properties for NMR can be phrased
in terms of extensions in argumentation too. For instance,
the well known Principle I from (Brewka and Eiter 1999)
regarding preferred answer sets can be applied to argu-
mentation semantics thus: if two extensions E1 and E2
coincide except for two arguments A ∈ E1 \ E2 and
B ∈ E2 \ E1 such that A is preferred over B, then E2
should not be chosen as a ‘preferable’ extension. Like-
wise, a common property of NMR says that, in the ab-
sence of preference information, a formalism extended
with a preference handling mechanism should return the
same extensions as the preference-free version of the for-
malism (see e.g. (Brewka, Truszczyn´ski, and Woltran 2010;
ˇSimko 2014)).
In this paper, drawing from the above mentioned
works, we investigate various properties of a recently
proposed NMR formalism ABA+ ( ˇCyras and Toni 2016).
ABA+ extends with a preference handling mechanism a
well established argumentation formalism, Assumption-
Based Argumentation (ABA) (Bondarenko et al. 1997;
Toni 2014). Whereas a common way to approach
preferences in argumentation is to use preference
information to discard the attacks from arguments
that are less preferred than the ones they attack (see
e.g. (Amgoud and Cayrol 2002; Bench-Capon 2003;
Kaci and van der Torre 2008; Brewka et al. 2013;
Besnard et al. 2014)), ABA+ instead reverses such at-
tacks. We show that ABA+’s method of accounting for
preferences satisfies (arguably) desirable properties.
On the one hand, we consider preference han-
dling properties from (Brewka and Eiter 1999;
Brewka, Truszczyn´ski, and Woltran 2010;
Amgoud and Vesic 2014) and show their satisfaction
under various ABA+ semantics. On the other hand, build-
ing on the investigations of Cumulative Transitivity and
Cautious Monotonicity for ABA ( ˇCyras and Toni 2015),
we analyse ABA+ in the light of these non-monotonic
inference properties, and show that results obtained for
ABA carry over to ABA+. In addition, we make use of
the well known principle of Contraposition of rules (see
e.g. (Modgil and Prakken 2013)) and prove it guarantees
that ABA+ semantics satisfy desirable properties akin
to those in e.g. (Dung 1995; Bondarenko et al. 1997;
Modgil and Prakken 2013).
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 give
preliminaries on ABA and ABA+. In Section 4 ABA+ se-
mantics are analysed. Preference handling properties of
ABA+ are studied in Section 5, while Section 6 concerns
ABA+ and non-monotonic inference properties. After dis-
cussing related work (Section 7), we conclude in Section 8.
2 Preliminaries
We base the following ABA background on (Toni 2014).
Definition 1. An ABA framework is a tuple (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯),
where:
• (L,R) is a deductive system with a language L and a set
R of rules of the form ϕ0 ← ϕ1, . . . , ϕm with m > 0
and ϕi ∈ L for i ∈ {0, . . . ,m}; ϕ0 is referred to as the
head of the rule, and ϕ1, . . . , ϕm is referred to as the body
of the rule; if m = 0, then the rule ϕ0 ← ϕ1, . . . , ϕm is
written as ϕ0 ← ⊤ and is said to have an empty body;
• A ⊆ L is a non-empty set, whose elements are referred to
as assumptions;
• ¯¯¯ : A → L is a total map: for α ∈ A, the L-formula α is
referred to as the contrary of α.
We focus on flat ABA frameworks, where no assumption
is the head of any rule. Flat ABA frameworks are very com-
mon, and capture, as instances, widely used paradigms of
non-monotonic reasoning, such as Logic Programming and
Default Logic (see e.g. (Bondarenko et al. 1997)).
Definition 2. A deduction for ϕ ∈ L supported by S ⊆ L
andR ⊆ R, denoted by S ⊢R ϕ, is a finite tree with the root
labelled by ϕ, leaves labelled by ⊤ or elements from S, the
children of non-leaf nodes ψ labelled by the elements of the
body of some rule from R with head ψ, and R being the set
of all such rules. For E ⊆ L, the conclusions Cn(E) of E
is the set of elements with deductions supported by S ⊆ E
and some R ⊆ R, i.e. Cn(E) = {ϕ ∈ L : ∃ S ⊢R ϕ, S ⊆
E, R ⊆ R}.
Assumption-level attacks in ABA are defined thus.
Definition 3. A set A ⊆ A attacks a set B ⊆ A, denoted
A  B, if there is a deduction A′ ⊢R β, for some β ∈ B,
supported by some A′ ⊆ A and R ⊆ R. For E ⊆ A, also
called an extension, we say that:
• E is conflict-free if E 6 E;
• E defendsα ∈ A if for allB  {α} it holds thatE  B;
• E is admissible if E is conflict-free and defends all α ∈
E.
The most standard ABA semantics are as follows.
Definition 4. A conflict-free set E ⊆ A is:
• stable, if E  {β} for every {β} ⊆ A \ E;
• complete if E is admissible and contains every assump-
tion it defends;
• preferred if E is ⊆-maximally admissible;
• grounded if E is ⊆-minimally complete;
• ideal if E is ⊆-maximal such that E is admissible and
contained in all preferred extensions.
Example 5. Let L = {α, β, α, β}, R = {α ← β} and
A = {α, β}. In (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯), {β} attacks both {α} and
{α, β}, while {α, β} attacks itself and {α}. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ) can
be graphically represented via its assumption framework,
pictured below (in illustrations of assumption frameworks,
nodes hold sets of assumptions while directed edges indi-
cate attacks):
∅ {α} {β} {α, β}
This (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯) has a unique complete extension {β},
which is also grounded, ideal, preferred and stable, and has
conclusions Cn({β}) = {α, β}.
3 ABA+
ABA+ ( ˇCyras and Toni 2016) extends ABA with prefer-
ences as follows.
Definition 6. An ABA+ framework is any tuple
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), where (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯) is an ABA frame-
work and 6 is a preorder (i.e. a transitive and reflexive
binary relation) on A.
Differently from e.g. (Modgil and Prakken 2013;
Modgil and Prakken 2014; Garcı´a and Simari 2014),
ABA+ considers preferences on assumptions rather than
(defeasible) rules. This is not, however, a conceptual differ-
ence, since assumptions are the only defeasible component
in ABA+.
Unless stated differently, we consider a fixed, but oth-
erwise arbitrary ABA+ framework (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), and
implicitly assume (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯) to be its underlying ABA
framework. The strict counterpart < of 6 is defined as
α < β iff α 6 β and β 
 α, for any α and β.
ABA+ attack relation is given thus.
Definition 7. A set A ⊆ A of assumptions <-attacks a set
B ⊆ A of assumptions, written as A < B, if:
• either there is a deduction A′ ⊢R β, for some β ∈ B,
supported by A′ ⊆ A, and ∄α′ ∈ A′ with α′ < β;
• or there is a deduction B′ ⊢R α, for some α ∈ A, sup-
ported by B′ ⊆ B, and ∃β′ ∈ B′ with β′ < α.
The first type of attack is called normal, and the second one
reverse.
ABA+ requires a standard ABA attack to be reversed
whenever the attacker has an assumption less preferred than
the one attacked. The following example illustrates.
Example 8. Recall (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯) from Example 5. Suppose
β < α. In the ABA+ framework (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), {β} ‘tries’
to attack {α}, but is prevented by the preference β < α. In-
stead, {α} <-attacks {β}, and likewise {α, β}, via reverse
attack, and the latter <-attacks both itself and {β} via re-
verse attack. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) can be represented graphically
as follows (reverse attacks in assumption frameworks will
be denoted by dotted arrows):
∅ {α} {β} {α, β}
In contrast with the ABA framework, where {β} is
unattacked and generates an attack on {α}, in the
ABA+ framework, {α} is <-unattacked and <-attacks all
sets of assumptions that contain β. This concords with the
intended meaning of the preference β < α, that the conflict
should be resolved in favour of α.
This concept of <-attack reflects the interplay between
deductions, contraries and preferences, by representing in-
herent conflicts among sets of assumptions while account-
ing for preference information. Normal attacks follow the
standard notion of attack in ABA, additionally, preventing
the attack to succeed when the attacker uses assumptions
less preferred than the one attacked. Reverse attacks, mean-
while, resolve the conflict between two sets of assumptions
by favouring the one containing an assumption whose con-
trary is deduced, over the one which uses less preferred as-
sumptions to deduce that contrary.
The notions of conflict-freeness and defence w.r.t.  <,
and ABA+ semantics are given as follows.
Definition 9. For E ⊆ A we say that:
• E is <-conflict-free if E 6 < E;
• E <-defends α ∈ A if for all B  < {α} it holds that
E  < B; and
• E is <-admissible if E is <-conflict-free and <-defends
every α ∈ E.
In Example 8, ∅, {α} and {β} are conflict-free in
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯) and<-conflict-free in (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), whereas
{α, β} is not (<-)conflict-free in either framework.
Definition 10. A <-conflict-free extension E ⊆ A is:
• <-stable if E  < {α} for every {α} ⊆ A \E;
• <-complete if E is <-admissible and contains every as-
sumption it <-defends;
• <-preferred if E is ⊆-maximally<-admissible;
• <-grounded if E is ⊆-minimally <-complete;
• <-ideal if E is ⊆-maximal such that E is <-admissible
and contained in all <-preferred extensions.
In Example 8, {α} is a unique <-stable, <-complete, <-
preferred,<-grounded and <-ideal extension.
Henceforth, we assume σ ∈ {stable, complete, preferred,
grounded, ideal} and use <-σ to denote any ABA+ seman-
tics.
We recall several features that ABA+ possesses and that
will be used later.
Lemma 1. Let A′ ⊆ A ⊆ A and B′ ⊆ B ⊆ A be given. If
A′  < B
′
, then A < B.
Lemma 2. For any A,B ⊆ A:
• if A B, then either A < B or B  < A;
• if A < B, then either A B or B  A.
4 Properties of ABA+ Semantics
To ensure that the familiar relations between semantics
carry from ABA over to ABA+, we want to guaran-
tee the so-called Fundamental Lemma (Dung 1995;
Bondarenko et al. 1997) (see below). To this end, we
follow the well established structured argumenta-
tion formalism ASPIC+ (Modgil and Prakken 2013;
Modgil and Prakken 2014) and impose the principle of
Contraposition, reformulated for ABA+ as follows.
Axiom 11. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) satisfies the Axiom of Contra-
position if for all A ⊆ A, R ⊆ R and β ∈ A it holds that
if A ⊢R β, then for every α ∈ A, there is Rα ⊆ R with
(A \ {α}) ∪ {β} ⊢Rα α.
This axiom requires that if an assumption plays a role in
deriving the contrary of another assumption, then it should
contrapositively be possible for the latter to induce a deriva-
tion of the contrary of the former assumption too. The fol-
lowing example illustrates the effect Contraposition has in
ABA+.
Example 12. Let R = {β ← α, γ}, A = {α, β, γ} and
α < β, α < γ. (The language and the contrary map-
ping are implicit from R and A.) This ABA+ framework
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) does not satisfy the Axiom of Contraposi-
tion. Its assumption framework (omitting ∅,A and<-attacks
to and from A) is shown below:
{α}
{β}
{γ}
{α, β}
{α, γ}
{β, γ}
There are no extensions under, for instance, <-complete se-
mantics, because all the singletons {α}, {β} and {γ} are
<-unattacked, but {α, β, γ} is not <-conflict-free.
If the rules α ← β, γ and γ ← α, β are added to R
to constitute R′, then the resulting (L,R′,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) satisfies
the Axiom of Contraposition and its assumption framework
looks as follows (<-attacks that are both normal and reverse
are depicted as solid directed edges):
{α}
{β}
{γ}
{α, β}
{α, γ}
{β, γ}
Here, {β, γ} is a unique<-complete extension.
We prove next that in the presence of Contraposition, the
Fundamental Lemma is guaranteed to hold in ABA+.
Lemma 3. Suppose that (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) satisfies the Axiom
of Contraposition. Let S ⊆ A be <-admissible and assume
that S <-defends α, α′ ∈ A. Then S ∪ {α} is <-admissible
and <-defends α′.
Proof. Note that if α ∈ S, then S ∪ {α} is trivially <-
admissible. So assume α 6∈ S and suppose for a contradic-
tion that S ∪ {α} is not <-admissible. Then it is either not
<-conflict-free, or does not <-defend itself. Suppose first
S ∪ {α}  < S ∪ {α} via either (1) normal or (2) reverse
attack. We show that either leads to a contradiction.
1. S ∪ {α}  < S ∪ {α} via normal attack. As S is <-
conflict-free and<-defendsα, this <-attack must involve α.
I.e. S′ ∪ {α} ⊢R β for some S′ ⊆ S and β ∈ S ∪ {α},
and ∀s′ ∈ S′ ∪ {α} we find s′ 6< β. If β = α, then S′ ∪
{α} < {α}, and so S  < S′ ∪ {α}. Else, if β ∈ S′, then
S′ ∪ {α} < S, and so S  < S′ ∪ {α} as well. We show
that we can similarly obtain S  < S′ ∪{α} in case (2) too.
2. S∪{α} < S∪{α} via reverse attack. As in 1., this<-
attack must involve α, i.e. S′ ∪ {α} ⊢R β for some S′ ⊆ S
and β ∈ S ∪ {α}, and ∃s′ ∈ S′ ∪ {α} such that s′ < β. If
β ∈ S, then S  < S′∪{α}. Else, if β = α, then s′ 6= α (by
asymmetry of<), and using the Axiom of Contraposition we
findA ⊢R′ s′ forA ⊆ (S′∪{α})\{s′}, so that S′∪{α} 
S. Then, by Lemma 2, either S′ ∪ {α}  < S or S  <
S′ ∪ {α}, which yields S  < S′ ∪ {α} in any case.
In either (1) or (2), S  < S′ ∪ {α}, and as S is <-
conflict-free and<-defends α, this<-attack must be reverse
and involve α: A1 ∪ {α} ⊢R1 s1, s1 ∈ S, A1 ⊆ S′, and
∃s′1 ∈ A1 with s′1 < s1. Without loss of generality take
s′1 to be 6-minimal such. By the Axiom of Contraposition,
there is S1 ∪ {α} ⊢R
′
1 s′1 with S1 ⊆ (A1 \ {s′1}) ∪ {s1}
and ∀x ∈ S1 x 6< s′1 (by 6-minimality of s′1). That is,
S1 ∪ {α}  < A1, so we find S  < S1 ∪ {α}, again via
reverse attack involving α: A2 ∪ {α} ⊢R2 s2, s2 ∈ S,
A2 ⊆ S1, and ∃s′2 ∈ A2 with s′2 < s2. We again im-
pose 6-minimality on s′2 and by the Axiom of Contrapo-
sition get S2 ∪ {α} ⊢R
′
2 s′2, S2 ⊆ (A2 \ {s
′
2}) ∪ {s2} and
∀x ∈ S2 x 6< s′2.
As deductions are finite and< asymmetric, the procedure
described above will eventually exhaust pairs of s′
k
∈ Ak
and sk ∈ Sk such that s′k < sk, so that S  < Sk ∪{α} will
have to be a normal attack, for some k. But this leads to a
contradiction to S being <-admissible and <-defending α.
Hence, by contradiction, S ∪ {α} is <-conflict-free.
We now want to show that S ∪ {α} <-defends itself. So
let B  < S ∪ {α}. As S is <-admissible and <-defends
α, we consider this <-attack to be reverse and involving α:
S′ ∪ {α} ⊢R β1, S′ ⊆ S, β1 ∈ B, and ∃s′ ∈ S′ ∪ {α}
with s′ < β1. By the Axiom of Contraposition, S1 ⊢R
′
1
s′, S1 ⊆ ((S′ ∪ {α}) \ {s′}) ∪ {β1}. Thus, S1  {s′},
whence S ∪ {α}  < S1. This <-attack cannot be normal
on (S′ ∪{α}) \ {s′}, due to <-conflict-freeness of S ∪{α};
while, if it is normal on β1, then S∪{α} < B, as required.
Else, S ∪ {α}  < S1 via reverse attack: B1 ⊢R1 s1, s1 ∈
S ∪ {α}, B1 ⊆ S1, and ∃s′1 ∈ B1 with s′1 < s1. Due
to <-conflict-freeness of S ∪ {α}, we find β1 ∈ B1. Then
again, by the Axiom of Contraposition, we find S2 ⊢R
′
2 s′1,
S2 ⊆ (B1 \ {s
′
1}) ∪ {s1}, and β1 ∈ S2. Like with the proof
of <-conflict-freeness, this process must terminate with a
normal attack S ∪ {α}  < B, so that S ∪ {α} eventually
<-defends itself.
Finally, given that S <-defends α′ to begin with, using
Lemma 1 we conclude that S ∪ {α} <-defends α′ too.
For the rest of this section, we assume that (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6)
satisfies the Axiom of Contraposition.
We can now define the <-defence operator Def, inspired
by (Dung 1995).
Definition 13. Def : ℘(A) → ℘(A) is defined as follows:
for A ⊆ A, Def(A) = {α ∈ A : A <-defends α}.
By Lemma 1, Def is monotonic: if A ⊆ B ⊆ A, then
Def(A) ⊆ Def(B). Hence, Def has a unique least fixed
point, which is in addition a unique <-grounded extension
of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), as shown next.
Proposition 4. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) admits a unique <-
grounded extension.
Proof. First, observe that ∅ is <-admissible in
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6). The least fixed point G can be given
as
⋃
i∈N
Def i(∅). By Lemma 3, G is <-admissible. It
is clearly <-complete (as G = Def(G)) and unique ⊆-
minimal such (as the least fixed point). Hence,G is a unique
<-grounded extension of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6).
As a consequence of Proposition 4, we get the following.
Corollary 5. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) admits a <-complete exten-
sion.
Using Lemma 3, we can prove the following results.
Proposition 6. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) admits a <-preferred exten-
sion.
Proof. By Lemma 3, the collection of <-admissible super-
sets of ∅ is partially ordered by subset inclusion ⊆, so any
sequence ∅ ⊆ A1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ An ⊆ . . . of <-admissible
sets of assumptions (for n an ordinal) has an upper bound
A =
⋃
i>0 Ai. Then A ⊆ A is <-admissible: if it were
not <-conflict-free, then some An would not be either; and
for any B  < A we have B  < An, for some n, so that
An  < B, and hence A  < B too. Since every chain
∅ ⊆ A1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ An ⊆ . . . admits an <-admissible upper
bound, every such chain has a ⊆-maximally <-admissible
set of assumptions, according to Zorn’s Lemma. As ∅ is <-
admissible, (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) admits at least one⊆-maximally
<-admissible—i.e. a <-preferred—extension.
Proposition 7. Every <-preferred extension of
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) is a <-complete extension too.
Proof. Let E be a <-preferred extension of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6)
and suppose for a contradiction that it is not <-complete.
Let E <-defend some α ∈ A \ E. As E is <-admissible,
E∪{α} is <-admissible, by Lemma 3. But then E is not⊆-
maximally <-admissible, contrary to E being <-preferred.
Hence, by contradiction,E must be <-complete.
Further, as in ABA, <-stable semantics is subsumed by
both<-preferred and<-complete semantics, as shown next.
Proposition 8. Any<-stable extension of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) is
a <-preferred extension too.
Proof. Let E be a<-stable extension of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6). As
E <-attacks every {β} * E, it must be ⊆-maximally <-
admissible. Hence, E is <-preferred.
Proposition 9. Any<-stable extension of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) is
a <-complete extension too.
Proof. LetE be a<-stable extension of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6). For
any β 6∈ E, <-stability of E means that E  < {β}, and if
E <-defended β as well, it would mean that E  < E, con-
tradicting its <-conflict-freeness. Hence, E contains every
assumption it <-defends, and so is <-complete.
Finally, we consider <-ideal semantics.
Proposition 10. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) admits a unique <-ideal
extension.
Proof. From Proposition 6 we know that (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) ad-
mits <-preferred extensions, so let S be their intersection. If
S = ∅, then it is <-admissible, and so an <-ideal exten-
sion (unique). If S 6= ∅ is <-admissible, then it is an <-
ideal extension (unique as well). Else, assume S 6= ∅ is not
<-admissible. Then its ⊆-maximally <-admissible subsets
I ( S are <-ideal extensions of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6). Suppose
I and I ′ are two distinct <-admissible subsets of S. Then
their union I ∪ I ′ is a subset of S too, and so <-conflict-
free. By Lemma 3, I ∪ I ′ <-defends its assumptions, so
must be <-admissible. Consequently, there can be only one
⊆-maximally<-admissible subset of S, i.e. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6)
has a unique <-ideal extension.
Proposition 11. Any<-ideal extension of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) is
a <-complete extension too.
Proof. By Proposition 10, it has a unique <-ideal exten-
sion I . Suppose for a contradiction that I is not<-complete.
Then there is α ∈ A \ I <-defended by I . Such α must be
contained in the intersection S of <-preferred extensions of
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), because I ⊆ S <-defends α and every <-
preferred extension E of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) is <-complete (by
Proposition 7). But then, I ∪ {α} is <-admissible, accord-
ing to Lemma 3, so that I is not <-ideal—a contradiction.
Therefore, I must be <-complete.
These properties that ABA+ exhibits in the presence of
Contraposition will be used to show, in the coming sec-
tions, that ABA+ satisfies certain principles of preference
handling and non-monotonic reasoning.
5 Preference Handling Properties
Referring to (Amgoud and Vesic 2009), in
(Brewka, Truszczyn´ski, and Woltran 2010) the authors
hinted at two (arguably) desirable properties of argumen-
tation formalisms dealing with preferences, that concern
conflict preservation and the absence of preferences. In the
next two subsections we indicate that ABA+ satisfies those
properties, and in the following subsections show that other
(arguably) desirable properties of preference handling are
too satisfied by ABA+.
5.1 Conflict Preservation
The first property insists that extensions returned after ac-
counting for preferences should be conflict-free with respect
to attack relation not taking into account preferences. We
formulate it as a principle applicable to ABA+ as follows.
Definition 14. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) fulfils the Principle of Con-
flict Preservation for <-σ semantics if for all <-σ ex-
tensions E ⊆ A of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), for any α, β ∈ A,
{α} {β} implies that either α 6∈ E or β 6∈ E.
In ( ˇCyras and Toni 2016) it was shown that Lemma 2
guarantees the following result.
Proposition 12. E ⊆ A is conflict-free in (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯) iff E
is <-conflict-free in (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6).
Consequently, ABA+ ensures conflict preservation:
Proposition 13. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) fulfils the Principle of Con-
flict Preservation for any semantics <-σ.
Proof. Let E be a <-σ extension of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), If
α, β ∈ E and {α}  {β}, then {α, β} is not conflict-free,
and hence not<-conflict-free, by Proposition 12. But thenE
is not <-conflict-free either, which is a contradiction. Thus,
either one of α and β does not belong to E.
5.2 Empty Preferences
The second property insists that if there are no preferences,
then the extensions returned using a preference handling
mechanism should be the same as those obtained without
accounting for preferences. We formulate it as a principle
applicable to ABA+ as follows.
Definition 15. Suppose that the preference relation 6
in (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) is the strict empty ordering ∅. Then
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ , ∅) fulfils the Principle of Empty Preferences
for ∅-σ semantics if for all ∅-σ extensions E ⊆ A of
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ , ∅), E is a σ extension of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯).
In ( ˇCyras and Toni 2016) the following result was shown
to hold.
Theorem 14. E ⊆ A is a σ-extension of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ) iff E
is an ∅-σ extension of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ , ∅).
This theorem, in addition to saying that ABA+ is a conser-
vative extension of ABA, immediately yields the satisfaction
of the principle in question:
Proposition 15. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ , ∅) fulfils the Principle of
Empty Preferences for any semantics ∅-σ.
5.3 Maximal Elements
(Amgoud and Vesic 2014) proposed a property concerning
inclusion in extensions of the ‘strongest’ arguments, i.e. ar-
guments that are maximal w.r.t. preference ordering. We
next reformulate the property to be applicable to ABA+.
Definition 16. Suppose the preference ordering 6 of
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) is total and further assume that the set M =
{α ∈ A : ∄β ∈ A with α < β} is <-conflict-free.
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) fulfils the Principle of Maximal Elements
for <-σ semantics if for all <-σ extensions E ⊆ A of
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), it holds that M ⊆ E.
As an illustration, in Example 8, α is a unique 6-
maximal element inA, and {α} is a unique<-σ extension of
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), whence (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) fulfils the Principle
of Maximal Elements for any semantics <-σ.
Our next result shows that in general, ABA+ satisfies this
principle under <-stable and <-complete semantics.
Proposition 16. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) fulfils the Principle of
Maximal Elements for <-stable and <-complete semantics.
Proof. Let the preference ordering 6 of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) be
total and suppose M = {α ∈ A : ∄β ∈ A with α < β} is
<-conflict-free. We first show that M is not <-attacked.
Fix α ∈M and suppose for a contradiction that for some
S ⊆ A it holds that S  < {α}. So either (i) ∃B ⊢R α with
B ⊆ S and ∀β ∈ B α 6 β or β 
 α, or (ii) {α} ⊢R β
for some β ∈ S with α < β. Note that the case (ii) cannot
happen, because α is6-maximal. So consider case (i). Since
6 is total, it follows that α 6 β ∀β ∈ B. But as α is 6-
maximal, it must also hold that β 6 α, for any β ∈ B. From
here, we show B ⊆ M . Indeed, fix β ∈ B and assume for
a contradiction that β 6∈ M . Then ∃γ ∈ A such that β < γ.
By transitivity, α < γ, contradicting α’s 6-maximality. So
we must have β ∈M , and consequently,B ⊆M .
But now, since α ∈ M, B ⊆ M and B  < {α}, this
contradicts <-conflict-freeness of M . Therefore, by contra-
diction, S 6 < {α}, for any S ⊆ A. Since α ∈ M was
arbitrary, we have M <-unattacked, as required.
If (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) admits no <-stable or <-complete ex-
tensions, then the principle is fulfilled trivially. Otherwise,
let E ⊆ A be <-stable in (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6). Pick α ∈ M and
suppose for a contradiction that α 6∈ E. Then E  < {α},
which is a contradiction. Thus, α ∈ S, and hence M ⊆ S.
Now let E be a <-complete extension of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6)
and suppose for a contradiction M * E. Then E does not
<-defend some α ∈M . This means that S  < M for some
S ⊆ A, which is a contradiction. Hence, M ⊆ E.
This principle may, however, be violated under, say,
<-preferred semantics: in Example 12, the framework
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) to begin with, admits {α, β} as a <-
preferred extension, while γ 6∈ {α, β} is a 6-maximal el-
ement. However, assuming Contraposition, the Principle of
Maximal Elements is satisfied under the remaining seman-
tics too.
Corollary 17. If (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) satisfies the Axiom of Con-
traposition, then it fulfils the Principle of Maximal Ele-
ments for <-preferred/<-ideal/<-grounded semantics.
Proof. Follows from Propositions 4, 7, 11 and 16.
5.4 Principle I
(Brewka and Eiter 2000) formulated a principle for sound
extension-based default reasoning with preferences, which
we reformulate for ABA+ next.
Definition 17. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) fulfils Principle I for <-σ
semantics if for all E,E′ ⊆ A such that E = E0 ∪ {α}
and E′ = E0 ∪ {α′} for some E0 ⊆ A, with α, α′ 6∈
E0 and α′ < α, it holds that if E is a <-σ exten-
sion of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), then E′ is not a <-σ extension of
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6).
This principle insists that if two coherent viewpoints of a
situation differ only in that each of them contains a single as-
sumption not contained in the other, then the viewpoint with
the more preferred assumption should be chosen. ABA+ sat-
isfies this principle under<-stable semantics.
Proposition 18. (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) fulfils Principle I for <-
stable semantics.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that both E = E0 ∪ {α}
andE′ = E0∪{α′}, where α′ < α, are<-stable extensions
of (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6). As E′ is <-stable and α 6∈ E′, we get
E′  < {α}. As E is <-conflict-free, we find E0 6 < {α},
so (from E′  < {α} we get that): (i) either there is E′′ ∪
{α′} ⊢R α with E′′ ⊆ E0 and ε 6< α ∀ε ∈ E′′ ∪ {α′};
(ii) or {α} ⊢R α′ is such that α < α′. As α′ < α, both
cases lead to a contradiction, so that E′ is not a <-stable
extension, provided E is.
In Example 8, E = {α} is a unique<-stable extension of
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), which illustrates the principle as follows:
take E0 = ∅ so that E = {α} and E′ = {β}, where β < α.
It is important that Principle I is satisfied under <-stable se-
mantics, because (Brewka and Eiter 1999) investigated (pre-
ferred) answer sets of logic programs, and answer sets in
Logic Programming correspond to stable extensions in ABA
(Bondarenko et al. 1997). Satisfaction of the principle gives
hope that preferred answer set semantics can be captured in
ABA+, as answer set semantics is captured in ABA.
Principle I, however, may be violated under <-preferred
semantics: in Example 12, (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) has two <-
preferred extensions {α, β} and {β, γ}, and yet α < γ.
Note, though, that (L,R′,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) satisfies the Axiom of
Contraposition and has a unique <-σ extension {β, γ}, and
thus fulfils Principle I for any semantics <-σ. Based on our
investigations, we conjecture that assuming Contraposition,
ABA+ frameworks fulfil the principle for the remaining se-
mantics as well. Verifying this is left as future work.
6 Non-Monotonic Reasoning Properties
( ˇCyras and Toni 2015) proposed and studied the well known
non-monotonic inference properties of Cautious Mono-
tonicity (MON henceforth) and Cumulative Transitivity
(CUT henceforth) for ABA. Here, we investigate some of
those properties for ABA+. We first recall (some of) the
properties considered and results obtained.1
Assume as given a fixed, but otherwise arbitrary (flat)
ABA framework F = (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ). Let E be a σ exten-
sion ofF . In what follows,E′ will denote a σ extension of a
newly constructed ABA frameworkF ′. To avoid trivialities,
we consider cases only where each of F and F ′ has at least
one σ extension—E and E′ respectively.
1In ( ˇCyras and Toni 2015), instead of sceptical/credulous (see
below) the words strong/weak were used, respectively; we have
altered the names to adhere to the more common terminology.
We first recall the STRICT setting regarding strengthen-
ing of information. Given ψ ∈ Cn(E) \ A, define F ′ =
(L,R∪ {ψ ← ⊤},A,¯¯). There are four properties:
SCEPTICAL STRICT CUT :
For all extensions E′ of F ′ we have Cn(E′) ⊆ Cn(E);
CREDULOUS STRICT CUT :
There is an extension E′ of F ′ with Cn(E′) ⊆ Cn(E);
SCEPTICAL STRICT MON :
For all extensions E′ of F ′ we have Cn(E) ⊆ Cn(E′);
CREDULOUS STRICT MON :
There is an extension E′ of F ′ with Cn(E) ⊆ Cn(E′).
Table 1 summarizes results pertaining to ABA (sceptical
and credulous versions coincide under grounded and ideal
semantics, and for other semantics the status of the credu-
lous property is indicated in parentheses).
Property Grd. Ideal Stable Pref. Cpl.
STRICT
CUT X X X (X) X (X) X (X)
STRICT
MON X X X (X) X (X) X (X)
Table 1: STRICT CUT /MON for standard ABA
We now recall the ASM setting, where conclusions that
are themselves assumptions are being confirmed. Given ψ ∈
Cn(E) ∩ A, define F ′ = (L,R ∪ {ψ ← ⊤},A \ {ψ},¯¯).2
The properties are as follows:
SCEPTICAL ASM CUT :
For all extensions E′ of F ′ we have Cn(E′) ⊆ Cn(E);
CREDULOUS ASM CUT :
There is an extension E′ of F ′ with Cn(E′) ⊆ Cn(E);
SCEPTICAL ASM MON :
For all extensions E′ of F ′ we have Cn(E) ⊆ Cn(E′);
CREDULOUS ASM MON :
There is an extension E′ of F ′ with Cn(E) ⊆ Cn(E′).
Table 2 summarizes results regarding ABA in the ASM
setting (notation as before).
Property Grd. Ideal Stable Pref. Cpl.
ASM CUT X X X (X) X (X) X (X)
ASM MON X X X (X) X (X) X (X)
Table 2: ASM CUT /MON for standard ABA
The non-monotonic inference properties CUT and
MON can be readily applied to ABA+. Take F to be an
ABA+ framework (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), let E be its <-σ exten-
sion, and given ψ ∈ Cn(E), define F ′ as follows:
2For brevity reasons, the same symbol ¯¯¯ is used for both con-
trary mappings, and in the new framework F ′, the contrary map-
ping¯¯¯ is implicitly restricted to a diminished set of assumptions.
• STRICT setting: F ′ = (L,R ∪ {ψ ← ⊤},A,¯¯,6);
• ASM setting: F ′ = (L,R ∪ {ψ ← ⊤},A \ {ψ},¯¯,6′),
where6′ is a restriction of 6 to A \ {ψ}.
We can then analyse whether the non-monotonic infer-
ence properties in question are satisfied in ABA+. Trivially,
as ABA+ is a conservative extension of ABA (cf. Theo-
rem 14), properties violated in ABA will remain violated
in ABA+. Therefore, we will focus on those that are satis-
fied in ABA; in particular, the credulous versions except for
MON under ideal semantics.
Example 18. As an illustration of the properties, recall Ex-
ample 12. The ABA+ frameworkF = (L,R′,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) (that
satisfies the Axiom of Contraposition) has a unique<-σ ex-
tension {β, γ} with Cn({β, γ}) = {α, β, γ}.
• STRICT setting: take α and let F ′ = (L,R ∪ {α ←
⊤},A,¯¯,6). ThenF ′ has a unique<-σ extension {β, γ}.
• ASM setting: take β and let F ′ = (L,R ∪ {β ← ⊤},A \
{β},¯¯,6′) with α <′ γ. Then F ′ likewise has a unique
<-σ extension {β, γ}.
As conclusions of extensions of both F and F ′ are actually
the same, the credulous versions of the properties are indeed
satisfied in both settings.
In what follows, we assume that (L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6) satisfies
the Axiom of Contraposition and show that ABA+ retains
the same satisfaction results of CUT and MON from ABA in
both STRICT and ASM settings.
Proposition 19. <-complete semantics satisfies
CREDULOUS STRICT CUT and CREDULOUS STRICT
MON.
Proof. Let E be a <-complete extension of F =
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), fix ψ ∈ Cn(E) \ A, and let F ′ = (L,R ∪
{ψ ← ⊤},A,¯¯,6). For ease of reference, we will denote
by < and ′< the <-attack relations in F and F ′ respec-
tively. We claim that E is a <-complete extension of F ′ too.
First, E is clearly <-conflict-free in F ′. Second, let α ∈ E
and suppose thatB′  ′< {α} for someB′ ⊆ AwithB′\E.
There are two possibilities.
Possibility 1: this <-attack uses the rule ψ ← ⊤. We split
into cases.
• First, assume B′  ′< {α} via normal attack. I.e., ∃B ⊢R
α with B ⊆ B′, R ⊆ R, and such that ∀β ∈ B β 6< α.
Consider some E0 ⊆ E with E0 ⊢R0 ψ, for some R0 ⊆
R. We have B ∪ E0 ⊢R∪R0 α.
– If ∀ε ∈ E0 we have ε 6< α, then B ∪ E0  < {α}, so
that E  < B ∪ E0, and thus (as E is <-admissible in
F and E0 ⊆ E) we find E  < B, whence E  ′< B
as well. Thus, E  < B′, as required.
– Else, if ∃ε ∈ E0 with ε < α, take 6-minimal such.
Then by the Axiom of Contraposition, there is (B∪E0\
{ε}) ∪ {α} ⊢R
′
ε, and by 6-minimality of ε, we find
that ∄x ∈ (B∪E0\{ε})∪{α} such that x < ε. Hence,
(B ∪E0 \ {ε})∪ {α} < {ε}, so that E  < B ∪E,
and hence E  ′< B, as in the previous case.
• Now assume B′  ′< {α} is a reverse attack, i.e., {α} ⊢R
β, β ∈ B′, R ⊆ R and α < β. By the Axiom of Con-
traposition, {β} ⊢R′ α via normal attack. Hence, we are
back in the first case above.
In any case, E <-defends α in F ′.
Possibility 2: the <-attack B′  ′< {α} does not involve
the rule ψ ← ⊤. That is, we actually have B′  < {α}.
Then, E  < B′, and hence E  ′< B′.
In any event, E <-defends α in F ′. Since α ∈ E was
arbitrary, we conclude that E is <-admissible in F ′.
It now suffices to show that E contains every assumption
it <-defends in F ′. To this end, suppose E <-defends α in
F ′, and suppose for a contradiction that α 6∈ E. Then E
does not <-defend α in F . That is, there is B  < {α}
such that E 6 < B. But now, we also have B  ′< {α},
so that E  ′< B, whence it must be that E  ′< B is a
normal attack that does not use some assumption ε ∈ E
(which is used to deduce ψ, i.e. E0 ⊢R0 ψ, ε ∈ E0 ⊆ E,
R0 ⊆ R) such that ε < β for some β ∈ B. Taking 6-
minimal such ε (and accordingly some βinB), the Axiom of
Contraposition guarantees that (E \ {ε})∪{β} < {ε} via
normal attack, and since ε ∈ E, it must be that E  < {β},
giving E  < B, which is a contradiction. Hence, α ∈ E
after all, and so E is <-complete in F ′, as required.
Proposition 20. <-preferred semantics satisfies
CREDULOUS STRICT CUT and CREDULOUS STRICT
MON.
Proof. Like in the proof of Proposition 19, we claim that a
<-preferred extension E of F is a <-preferred extension of
F ′. Indeed, if E were not⊆-maximally<-admissible in F ′,
then for some β ∈ A \ E, E ∪ {β} would be <-admissible
in F ′. Verbatim to the proof for <-complete semantics, we
could show that E ∪ {β} is <-admissible in F too, contra-
dicting E being <-preferred in F .
Proposition 21. <-stable semantics satisfies CREDULOUS
STRICT CUT and CREDULOUS STRICT MON.
Proof. Like in the proof of Proposition 19, we claim that a
<-stable extension E of F is a <-stable extension of F ′.
Indeed, let β 6∈ E. Then E  < {β}. Whether it is a normal
or reverse attack, we clearly have E  ′< {β} too. Hence,E
is <-stable in F ′, provided E is <-stable in F .
Proposition 22. <-grounded semantics satisfies
CREDULOUS STRICT CUT and CREDULOUS STRICT
MON.
Sketch. Using the argument as in Proposition 19, it can be
proven by induction on the construction of the <-grounded
extension G of F (cf. Proposition 4) that G is the <-
grounded extension of F ′.
Corollary 23. <-ideal semantics satisfies CREDULOUS
STRICT CUT.
Proof. This follows by definition of the <-ideal extension
and Proposition 20.
Now, in the ASM setting, the came results can be obtained
as in the STRICT setting, with essentially the same proofs.
Proposition 24. <-complete/<-preferred/<-stable/<-
grounded semantics satisfies CREDULOUS ASM CUT and
CREDULOUS ASM MON, and <-ideal semantics satisfies
CREDULOUS ASM CUT.
Sketch. Let E be a <-complete extension of F =
(L,R,A,¯ ¯¯ ,6), fix ψ ∈ Cn(E) ∩ A, and let F ′ = (L,R ∪
{ψ ← ⊤},A \ {ψ},¯¯,6′), where 6′ is a restriction of 6
to A \ {ψ}. It can be shown that E is a <-complete exten-
sion of F ′, by replacing, in the proof of Proposition 19, E0
and E0 ⊢R0 ψ with {ψ} and {ψ} ⊢∅ ψ respectively. Other
claims follow the same line of reasoning as for the proofs in
the STRICT setting.
Table 3 summarizes this section’s results (sceptical and
credulous versions coincide under <-grounded and <-ideal
semantics; for other semantics the credulous version is indi-
cated in parentheses.)
Property <-g. <-id. <-stb. <-pr. <-cpl.
STRICT and
ASM CUT X X X (X) X (X) X (X)
STRICT and
ASM MON X X X (X) X (X) X (X)
Table 3: (STRICT and ASM) CUT and MON for ABA+
7 Related and Future Work
The principle of Contraposition of (strict)
rules (see e.g. (Caminada and Amgoud 2007;
Modgil and Prakken 2013)) is notably employed
in the well studied structured argumentation
formalism ASPIC+ (Modgil and Prakken 2013;
Modgil and Prakken 2014). The principle as such is also in-
herently present in classical logic-based approaches to struc-
tured argumentation such as (Gorogiannis and Hunter 2011;
Besnard and Hunter 2014). Similarly as in ASPIC+,
ABA+ utilizes Contraposition to ensure the Fundamental
Lemma (cf. Lemma 3). As a consequence, Contraposi-
tion paves way to satisfaction of desirable properties of
ABA+ semantics, as well as preference handling and
non-monotonic inference properties discussed in Sections 5
and 6. Whether the Axiom of Contraposition can be relaxed
for ABA+ to obtain the same results is a line of future
research.
The preference handling principle discussed in Section
5.4 was originally proposed, along with some other prop-
erties, by (Brewka and Eiter 1999) for answer set program-
ming (ASP) with preferences. To the best of our knowledge,
reformulation of Principle I for ABA+ is the first application
of this principle to argumentation with preferences. Building
on (Brewka and Eiter 1999), ( ˇSimko 2014) discussed an ex-
tended set of principles for ASP with preferences, most of
which focus on preferences over rules. Whether those prin-
ciples can be applied to ABA+ is a future work direction.
Regarding preference handling in argumentation, along
with the Principle of Maximal Elements discussed in Sec-
tion 5.3, (Amgoud and Vesic 2014) suggested several ar-
guably desirable properties of argumentation with prefer-
ences. Those properties are exhibited in ABA+ as Propo-
sition 12 and Theorem 14. Referring to those proper-
ties, (Brewka, Truszczyn´ski, and Woltran 2010) also hinted
at other properties regarding selection among extensions, as
possible principles of preference handling in argumentation.
Relating those principles to ABA+ is left for future work.
In terms on non-monotonic reasoning properties,
Cautious Monotonicity and Cumulative Transitivity
(studied in Section 6) are traced to (Makinson 1988;
Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990) and fall into the
well studied area of analysing non-monotonic reasoning
with respect to information change (cf. (Rott 2001)).
In argumentation setting, the latter is also known as
argumentation dynamics, and has recently been a
topic of interest in the argumentation community (see
e.g. (Cayrol, de Saint-Cyr, and Lagasquie-Schiex 2010;
Falappa et al. 2011; Baroni et al. 2014;
Coste-Marquis et al. 2014; Booth et al. 2014;
Diller et al. 2015; Baumann and Brewka 2015)). In
particular, non-monotonic inference properties were
investigated in (Hunter 2010) with respect to argument–
claim entailment in logic-based argumentation systems;
in ( ˇCyras and Toni 2015) for ABA; and with regards to
ASPIC+-type-of argumentation systems in (Dung 2016).
Only the latter of the three works concerns argumentation
with preferences. In addition to considering different
structured argumentation setting and different preference
handling mechanisms, it diverges from our analysis in
Section 6 in that (Dung 2016) regards Cumulative Transi-
tivity plus Cautious Monotonicity as a single property of
Cumulativity and studies it only for stable and complete
semantics. Other argumentation-related properties from
(Dung 2016) will be studied for ABA+ in the future.
Several other topics of interest are left for future
work. For instance, integrating dynamic preferences
(see e.g. (Prakken and Sartor 1999; Zhang and Foo 1997;
Brewka and Woltran 2010)) within ABA+ and study-
ing their interaction with the properties of prefer-
ence handling as well as of non-monotonic infer-
ence. Also, relation of ABA+ to Logic Program-
ming with preferences (e.g. (Sakama and Inoue 1996;
Zhang and Foo 1997; Brewka and Eiter 1999)) and
non-monotonic reasoning formalisms equipped
with preferences in general (e.g. (Brewka 1989;
Baader and Hollunder 1995; Rintanen 1998;
Brewka and Eiter 2000; Delgrande and Schaub 2000;
Stolzenburg et al. 2003; Kakas and Moraitis 2003)) is left
for future research.
There are as well numerous approaches to in-
tegrating reasoning with preferences within ar-
gumentation, e.g. (Amgoud and Cayrol 2002;
Bench-Capon 2003; Kaci and van der Torre 2008;
Modgil 2009; Modgil and Prakken 2010;
Baroni et al. 2011; Dunne et al. 2011; Brewka et al. 2013;
Amgoud and Vesic 2014; Besnard and Hunter 2014;
Garcı´a and Simari 2014; Wakaki 2014;
Modgil and Prakken 2013; Modgil and Prakken 2014;
Dung 2016). It would be interesting to study these for-
malisms with respect to the properties considered in this
paper, where it has not already been done. We leave this as
future work.
8 Conclusions
We investigated various properties of a recently
proposed non-monotonic reasoning formalism
ABA+ ( ˇCyras and Toni 2016) that deals with prefer-
ences in structured argumentation. In particular, we first
established that assuming the principle of Contraposition
(see e.g. (Modgil and Prakken 2013)), ABA+ semantics
exhibit desirable properties akin to those of other existing
argumentation formalisms, such as (Dung 1995). We then
showed that ABA+ satisfies some (arguably) desirable
principles of preference handling in argumentation and
non-monotonic reasoning, e.g. (Brewka and Eiter 1999).
Finally, we analysed non-monotonic inference properties
(as in ( ˇCyras and Toni 2015)) of ABA+ under various
semantics. We believe our work contributes to the under-
standing of preferences within argumentation in particular,
and in non-monotonic reasoning at large.
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